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INTRODUCTION
I have no idea whether my death will be noted in the New York Times.
But if it is, I fear the headline of my obituary will look something like:
"Professor Dies; Lost Hudson v. Michigan' in Supreme Court, Leading to
Abolition of Exclusionary Rule." The very existence of this Symposium panel
shows, I think, that my fear is well-grounded.
On the other hand, I am not quite as fearful that Hudson foreshadows
the complete overruling of Mapp v. Ohio2 and Weeks v. United States3 as I was
when I published an article just three months after the Hudson decision
came down. 4 The Supreme Court does not seem to be in a hurry to take on
the exclusionary rule-at least not directly-and only a tiny handful of lower
courts since Hudson have applied the reasoning of the Hudson majority to
deny exclusion of evidence for constitutional violations other than the
knock-and-announce rule.5
In this Symposium, then, I propose to do two different things. First, in
the event that my worst fears are realized and Hudson comes to be seen as a
historic case leading to a sea change in the law, I want to create a record of
some of the background events that led to the decision so that future
scholars might understand how it is that I came to litigate the Hudson case
and how it is that I managed to lose it.
Second, I will review developments since Hudson in order to gauge the
likelihood that my worst fears will be realized in the foreseeable future. In
particular, I will look at the depressing effect Hudson seems to have had on
the Court's Fourth Amendment docket, and I will examine the more
aggressive approach to Hudson that a few lower courts have taken. I will also
briefly examine the two Fourth Amendment cases the Court recently agreed
to decide next term and consider whether either of those cases is likely to
result in any further damage to the exclusionary rule.
Thus, my presentation will focus on the events leading up to Hudson
and the fallout since Hudson, but I will not analyze the opinion,
concurrence, or dissent in Hudson itself. I will leave that task to others, both
because I have already published a fairly lengthy analysis of the various
opinions in Hudson6 and because my involvement in the case makes it
difficult for me to step back and reanalyze the decision with any objectivity,
even now.
1. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
2. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. See David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The Roberts
Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, 2006 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 283, 283 (2006) (positing that the
Hudson decision "signals the end of the Fourth Amendment as we know it").
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See Moran, supra note 4, at 295-309.
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I. WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD CASES: How BAD TIMING TURNED
A FOURTH AMENDMENT FOOTNOTE INTO A POTENTIAL BLOCKBUSTER
If my worst fears are realized, scholars someday will be wondering,
"What was Moran thinking when he brought this case to the Supreme
Court?" This is my defense.
A. ALL ACCORDING TO PLAN: FINDING BOOKER T. HUDSON, JR. AND
THE FIRST ARGUMENT
The first thing that needs to be understood as to how Hudson came to
be is that the Michigan Supreme Court has been one of the nation's most
consistently conservative courts since the late 1990s. 7 Because conservative
justices dominate, the court has, on occasion, been willing to go farther out
on a limb to the right than any other court. In the criminal procedure area,
this willingness to be an outlier resulted in two criminal procedure cases
reaching the U.S. Supreme Court, Halbert v. Michigan8 and Hudson. Since I
was the (winning) attorney for the indigent defendant in Halbert, to
understand why I got involved in Hudson requires me to say a word about
Halbert.
In 2000, thanks to the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in People v.
Bulger,9 Michigan became the first and only state since 1963 to deny the
assistance of counsel for first-tier direct appeals to most indigent defendants
convicted of felonies. 10 According to the Michigan Supreme Court, indigent
defendants who plead guilty or nolo contendere to felonies are perfectly
capable of figuring out how to file their own applications to appeal their
convictions and sentences. 1
I argued and lost Bulger in the Michigan Supreme Court, and I served as
lead counsel in Halbert, where the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Bulger by a
six to three vote. As I litigated the right-to-counsel cases in the lower federal
courts and the Supreme Court, it became clear that the most important
7. I'm not the only one to notice this conservatism. See generally Sarah K. Delaney, High
Court Study, Stare Decisis v. the "New Majority": The Michigan Supreme Court's Practice of Overruling
Precedent, 1998-2002, 66 ALB. L. REV. 871 (2003) (recognizing that the Michigan Supreme Court
is dominated by conservative justices); John D. Echeverria, Changing the Rules by Changing the
Players: The Environmental Issue in State Judicial Elections, 9 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 217, 271 (2001)
(noting that "five out of seven Michigan Supreme Court justices are or were members of the
conservative Federalist Society").
8. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005).
9. People v. Bulger, 614 N.W.2d 103 (Mich. 2000).
10. In 1963, the Supreme Court held in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), that the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses guaranteed indigent
defendants the assistance of counsel for first-tier direct appeals from felony convictions. Id. at
357.
11. See Bulger, 614 N.W.2d at 113-15 (concluding that indigents would have meaningful
access to Michigan appellate courts because of the simplicity of plea proceedings and appeals).
1727
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argument I had on my side was that no other state or federal court had gone
as far as the Michigan Supreme Court had in denying counsel to indigents.
It was through this lens that I viewed the Michigan Supreme Court's
1999 decision in People v. Stevens12 as extremely vulnerable. In Stevens, the
Michigan Supreme Court held, over the dissent of two justices, that evidence
found inside a home following a knock-and-announce violation was not
subject to the exclusionary rule because, according to the majority, had the
police bothered to knock and announce pursuant to the warrant, they would
have "inevitably discovered" the same evidence. 13
At the time Stevens came down, no other state or federal court had ever
held that exclusion was an unavailable remedy for a knock-and-announce
violation. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court had itself twice excluded
evidence following violations of the federal knock-and-announce rule14
decades before the Court finally recognized in 1995 that the knock-
and-announce rule is incorporated into the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness clause. 15
Not only was Stevens an outlier, it was a harshly criticized outlier.
Professor LaFave, for one, devoted several pages of his seminal Fourth
Amendment treatise to excoriating the logic of the Stevens decision,
characterizing the majority as adopting an "Alice-in-Wonderland version of
inevitable discovery" 16 under which the police can always claim, "'if we
hadn't done it wrong, we would have done it right."' 17
12. People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53 (Mich. 1999).
13. As the majority held in Stevens.
Given that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered, allowing the
evidence in does not put the prosecution in any better position than it would be in
had the police adhered to the knock-and-announce requirement. However,
excluding the evidence puts the prosecution in a worse position than it would have
been in had there been no police misconduct. Therefore, the inevitable discovery
exception to the exclusionary rule should be available to the prosecution in the
present case.
Id. at 62.
14. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 586 (1968) ("We hold that the method of
entry vitiated the arrest and therefore that evidence seized in the subsequent search incident
thereto should not have been admitted at petitioner's trial."); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301, 313-14 (1958) ("Because the petitioner did not receive that notice before the officers
broke the door to invade his home, the arrest was unlawful, and the evidence seized should
have been suppressed.").
15. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927,934 (1995).
16. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
273 (4th ed. 2004).
17. Id at 272 (quoting State v. Topanotes, 76 P.3d 1159, 1164 (Utah 2003)). For examples
of other commentators who criticized Stevens, see, for example, Mattias Luukkonen, Knock,
Knock. What's Inevitably There? An Analysis of the Applicability of the Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery to
Knock and Announce Violations, 35 MCGEORGE L. REv'. 153, 174-75 (2004); Robin L. Gentry,
Note, Why Knock? The Door Will Inevitably Open: An Analysis of People v. Stevens and the Michigan
1728 [20081
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I admit I was surprised when the Seventh Circuit issued a decision in
2002 adopting the logic of Stevens.18 But I still thought the Supreme Court, if
given an opportunity to review the issue, would view Stevens as a radical
misinterpretation of the inevitable discovery doctrine. My confidence was
based on the fact that other state and federal appellate courts continued to
routinely exclude evidence found after knock-and-announce violations, and
at least ten of those courts had explicitly rejected the inevitable discovery
argument that Stevens had accepted. 19
I hope I can be forgiven, then, for thinking that Stevens was a prime
candidate for overruling in the U.S. Supreme Court. Beginning in 2001, I
decided to look for a case to accomplish just that.
As a law professor specializing in criminal procedure, I get invited to
give a lot of speeches to groups of practicing criminal defense attorneys.
Starting in 2001, no matter what the subject of my speech, I always threw in
an aside in which I harshly criticized Stevens and then said something like,
"And if any of you have a case with a clear knock-and-announce violation
that you cannot win because of Stevens, give me a call and I'll file a cert
petition for you."
In February 2005, just as I was preparing to argue Halbert, I received a
call out of the blue from a Detroit attorney named Richard Kor. Mr. Korn
told me that he had been at one of my speeches some years earlier, and he
was wondering if my offer was still valid. He went on to explain that the
Michigan Supreme Court had just denied his application for leave to appeal
the conviction of his client, one Booker T. Hudson, Jr., who had been
convicted of cocaine possession after a knock-and-announce violation. I
agreed to take a look at the file.
When the file arrived a few days later, I realized that the case was the
perfect vehicle to challenge Stevens. First, there was never any dispute that a
knock-and-announce violation occurred since the officer who led the team
that executed the warrant on Mr. Hudson's home candidly admitted in a
suppression hearing that he had no information justifying dispensing with
the requirement, that no one had knocked on the door, and that the police
officers immediately burst through the door without waiting after yelling,
Supreme Court's Departure From Fourth Amendment Protection, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1659, 1659-60
(2000).
18. United States v. Langford, 314 F.3d 892, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1075 (2003).
19. See United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 984-86 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Marts,
986 F.2d 1216, 1220 (8th Cir. 1993); Mazepink v. State, 987 S.W.2d 648, 657-58 (Ark. 1999),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 927 (1999); Kellom v. State, 849 So. 2d 391, 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003);
People v. Tate, 753 N.E.2d 347, 351-52 (Il1. App. Ct. 2001); State v. Lee, 821 A.2d 922, 931-46
(Md. 2003); State v. Taylor, 733 N.E.2d 310, 312 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); Commonwealth v.
Rudisill, 622 A.2d 397, 400 n.7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); State v. Lee, 836 S.W.2d 126, 128-30
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); Price v. State, 93 S.W.3d 358, 370-72 (Tex. App. 2003).
1729
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"Police! Search Warrant!"20 Given this testimony, the prosecutor at the
suppression hearing conceded that there was a knock-and-announce
violation. 2 1
A second reason I thought the case was ideal was that Mr. Hudson was
convicted of a relatively minor offense, simple possession of five rocks of
crack cocaine, for which he received no jail time at all. At the time of the
raid, Mr. Hudson was a middle-aged man living with his wife in a single-
family home in Detroit. I thought Mr. Hudson would be about as
sympathetic as any criminal defendant trying to suppress evidence could be
to the Court.
So I filed a petition for certiorari in April 2005. On June 27, 2005, just
four days after ruling in my favor in Halbert, the Court granted the petition
in Hudson.22
As I explained in my earlier article, I really thought the case was simply
about the inevitable discovery doctrine and the knock-and-announce rule,
not about the continuing vitality of the exclusionary rule itself.23 I wrote a
brief that was all about the proper contours of the inevitable discovery
doctrine and the need to suppress evidence in order to compel police
officers to comply-with the knock-and-announce rule. I cited Mapp and Weeks
only in passing and just for the proposition that other remedies would not
be effective in enforcing the knock-and-announce requirement.
24
My understanding of what the case was about was borne out by the oral
argument on January 9, 2006. There was no hint in that argument that the
Court, or even any Justice, was prepared to reconsider Mapp and Weeks. The
argument went well, or so I thought. It seemed clear to me (and to several
journalists who observed the argument) that a majority of the Court,
including, in particular, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, was prepared to
reverse and bring Michigan back into line with all of the other jurisdictions
(except the Seventh Circuit) that suppressed evidence as a result of knock-
and-announce violations.25
20. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-9, Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006)
(No. 04-1360) (testimony of OfficerJamal Good).
21. Id. at 9-10 (concession of prosecutor).
22. Hudson v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 1138 (2005) (order granting petition for certiorari).
23. See Moran, supra note 4, at 298-99.
24. Brief of Petitioner at 36, 40, 42, Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2166 (2006) (No. 04-
1360) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52, 655 (1961) and Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 393 (1914)).
25. See Moran, supra note 4, at 299 & n.78. Both Linda Greenhouse of the New York Times
and Charles Lane of the Washington Post wrote after the decision came out that it appeared that
a majority including Justice O'Connor was prepared to rule in Mr. Hudson's favor after the first
argument and that this majority was apparently lost when Justice O'Connor was replaced by
Justice Alito. Linda Greenhouse, Court Limits Protection Against Improper Entry, N.Y. TIMES, June
16, 2006, at A28; Charles Lane, Court Eases "No Knock" Search Ban; Illegally Collected Evidence
Allowed, WASH. POST, June 16, 2006, at Al.
[2008]1730
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Twenty-two days later, on January 31, 2006, Samuel A. Alito was sworn in
to replace Justice O'Connor. At that point, I began to get nervous. If the
vote in Hudson was five to four with Justice O'Connor in the majority, I
knew I would be getting a reargument order shortly after Justice Alito took
office. So, I held my breath.
Indeed, the Court quickly ordered reargument in one case just
seventeen days after Justice Alito joined it.26 A second reargument order
came out in another case in March, 27 but as March turned into April, I
became reasonably confident that Hudson would not be reargued. After all,
the Court's argument calendar was scheduled to end on April 26, 2006. By
the time I spoke to a student group at the Michigan State University College
of Law on April 14, I felt confident enough to answer a question as to the
likelihood that Justice Alito's appointment would affect the outcome in
Hudson with a flat statement that I would have heard by then if the case was
going to be reargued.
Boy, was I wrong. On Wednesday, April 19, 2006, I received a phone
call from Denise McNerney, the assistant clerk at the Court, and the
conversation went almost exactly like this:
McNerney: David, I'm calling to inform you that the Court has ordered
reargument in Hudson v. Michigan.
Me: Bummer.
McNerney: So, how about next Wednesday?
Me: (Pause). Denise, you must be kidding.
Fortunately, my opponent, Timothy Baughman of the Wayne County
Prosecutor's Office, and I agreed that it was out of the question for us to
travel to Washington and reargue the case in one week. The Court relented,
and Ms. McNerney called back a short time later to inform us that the case
was set for reargument twenty-nine days later, on May 18, 2006-some three
weeks after the Court had otherwise completed its oral argument calendar.
B. THE REJARGUMENT: ALL ABOUT MAPP
I estimate that I have delivered some two hundred appellate arguments
to state and federal courts in my career, but none of them could have
prepared me for what I encountered at the reargument. The questioning
seemed much more aggressive than it was at the first argument, but that was
not what was so surprising.
What so surprised me was the line of questioning Justice Scalia
developed at the very end of my argument:
Justice Scalia: What about-you talk about deterrence. What about
their not getting promoted? I assume that-that police
departments, even if you have some maverick officers, that the
26. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 546 U.S. 1162 (2006) (setting the case for reargument).
27. Kansas v. Marsh, 547 U.S. 1037 (2006) (setting the case for reargument).
1731
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administration of the police department teaches them that they
have to knock and announce. Or if it doesn't teach them that, then
you do have a 1983 cause of action against the city, not just the
officers. And that-you know, that's a deep pocket.
Mr. Moran: I very seriously doubt officers such as Officer Good will
not be promoted because of the violation that he committed.
Justice Scalia: Why? Really? .... .. [Y]ou know, I'm the police
commissioner and I have a policy that you-you obey the law, you
knock and announce, and-and I know that this particular officer
disregards it all the time. You really think that's not going to go in
his record?
Mr. Moran: I do, Justice Scalia, and I think it's inconsistent with
Mapp in which the Court recognized that other remedies have
proven completely futile in enforcing the-the Fourth
Amendment.
Justice Scalia: Mapp was a long time ago. It was before 1983 was
being used, wasn't it?
Mr. Moran: It was before 1983 was... being used. But I don't think
section 1983 has changed the landscape here. I-I don't think
Mapp is ripe for overruling, and in fact, the Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation, one of the amici for the other side, concedes that tort
remedies cannot, at this time, substitute for the exclusionary rule.28
Until that moment, I honestly had no clue that the entire exclusionary
rule had come into play. I do not think some of the Justices yet realized it,
either. After I sat down, one of my co-counsel told me that Justice Souter
had actually snorted when Justice Scalia asked if the threat of a withheld
promotion could deter officers from committing Fourth Amendment
violations.
The rest, as they say, is history. Justice Scalia's majority opinion in
Hudson contained a full-frontal attack on the rationale of the exclusionary
rule; and it treated Mapp as an outdated precedent because of the increased
availability of civil remedies and the alleged improvements in "police
professionalism" since Mapp.29 As Justice Scalia so colorfully put it in
explaining why Mapp can no longer be seen as controlling,
We cannot assume that exclusion in this context is necessary
deterrence simply because we found that it was necessary
deterrence in different contexts and long ago. That would be
28. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-33, Hudson, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 04-1360).
29. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166-68.
1732 [20081
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forcing the public today to pay for the sins and inadequacies of a
legal regime that existed almost half a century ago.30
It seems clear that Hudson would have amounted to an outright
overruling of Mapp were it not for Justice Kennedy's strange concurring
opinion. In the first paragraph of that concurrence, he wrote that, despite
his decision to sign on to the parts of Justice Scalia's majority opinion
denigrating Mapp and thereby providing the fifth vote for those statements,
"the continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by
our precedents, is not in doubt."3 1
Despite Justice Kennedy's anodyne reassurances, just about everyone
who read Hudson when it came down in June 2006 understood that the
continuing vitality of the exclusionary rule was most certainly in doubt.32 In
my earlier article written just a few months after Hudson came down, I
described the exclusionary rule as "on life support" and suggested that the
Court could well overrule Mapp itself "within a few years."33 In the next
section, I will examine how the exclusionary rule has fared since I made that
prediction.
30. Id. at 2167.
31. Id. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring). I attempted in my earlier article to discern
exactly whatJustice Kennedy was thinking when he simultaneously signed on to the key parts of
Justice Scalia's majority opinion and wrote his separate concurrence. See Moran, supra note 4, at
303-04. I do not have any better idea what he was thinking now than I did then, so I will not
give it another shot here.
32. For a sampling of some of the early scholarly commentary recognizing that Hudson was
a threat to the exclusionary rule itself, see, e.g., Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons
from the Highway and the Subway: A Principled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J.
719, 788 (2007) (recognizing that the majority opinion in Hudson "clearly implies that the
exclusionary rule's days are numbered"); Chris Blair, Hudson v. Michigan: The Supreme Court
Knocks and Announces the Demise of the Exclusionary Rule, 42 TULSA L. REV. 751, 751 (2007)
(recognizing that the "long-range effect" of Hudson "may be the actual demise of the
exclusionary rule itself"); Erwin Chemerinsky, An Overview of the October 2005 Supreme Court Term,
22 TOURO L. REV. 873, 879 (2007) (concluding that after Hudson, "the continued existence of
the exclusionary rule [and] the exceptions that will be created, all depend on Justice
Kennedy"); Thomas Y. Davies, An Account ofMapp v. Ohio that Misses the Larger Exclusionary Rule
Story, 4 OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L. 619, 619 (2007) (recognizing that Hudson had put the exclusionary
rule in doubt); David J.R. Frakt, Fruitless Poisonous Trees in a Parallel Universe: Hudson v.
Michigan, Knock-and-Announce, and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 715-30
(2007) (arguing that Hudson threatens to remove the exclusionary sanction from large
categories of Fourth Amendment violations, including, inter alia, violations for which there will
be no excludable fruit and violations where the police could have performed the same search
lawfully); Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court's Agenda-and the Nations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4,
28 n.76 (arguing that the Court's refusal to exclude evidence in Hudson and Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006), "signals growing doubts about the future viability of the
exclusionary rule itself").
33. Moran, supra note 4, at 295, 307-09.
1733
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II. TWENTY MONTHS OF SILENCE: WHEN (IF EVER) WILL MAPPBE TESTED?
Anyone who read Justice Scalia's majority opinion to mean that a direct
assault on Mapp would soon be forthcoming must have been disappointed
by the two terms that have (nearly) passed since Hudson was decided.
Not only has the Court not taken any Fourth Amendment cases
directly presenting the Mapp issue, the Court has hardly taken any Fourth
Amendment cases at all. It is as if the Court wishes to stay away from a
divisive subject until it is clear there is a majority prepared to act.
Until the past few months, the federal courts of appeals and state
supreme courts had also reacted cautiously to Hudson. Those courts had, of
course, applied Hudson to deny exclusionary relief to victims of knock-and-
announce violations. Only in the past few months have a few courts begun to
apply Hudson's rationale to new situations. 34 It is these cases, I believe, that
will finally force the Court's hand, but not until after the crucial presidential
election of November 2008.
A. WHY THE COURT Is AVOIDING A MAPP SHOWDOWN FOR Now
In my earlier article, I suggested that the Court might deny petitions
directly raising the Mapp issue because Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion creates uncertainty. 35 I now believe this is true. In fact, I believe the
Court, for nearly two years, avoided taking criminal cases presenting Fourth
Amendment issues as a class because most of the members of the Court did
not want to be confronted with an opportunity to reaffirm or overrule Mapp
squarely until the composition of the Court changes.
For nearly a century, the Court heard and decided, on average, four
Fourth Amendment cases per year.36 In the six terms immediately preceding
Hudson (and including the Hudson term itself), the Court decided thirty
cases in which the Fourth Amendment was the basis of decision, and twenty-
one of those thirty cases (seventy percent) were criminal cases, that is, cases
in which a criminal defendant was attempting to suppress evidence.3 7
34. See infra Part II.B.
35. As I put it then, "Perhaps the uncertainty injustice Kennedy's position will cause both
the other fourjustices in the Hudson majority and the four justices in the Hudson dissent to vote
to deny the petition." Moran, supra note 4, at 308. I also hedged my bet by suggesting that
perhaps a bloc of four justices might feel confident enough aboutJustice Kennedy's position on
Mapp to vote to accept a petition squarely putting Mapp into play. Id. at 308-09.
36. In his dissent in Hudson, Justice Breyer noted that the Court had decided 332 Fourth
Amendment cases in the 88 years between 1914, when Weeks was decided, and 2002. Hudson v.
Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2176 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing W. GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT HANDBOOK: A CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONs 27-130 (2d
ed. 2003)).
37. The twenty criminal cases, not including Hudson, decided from October 2000 Term to
October 2005 Term were Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547
U.S. 398 (2006); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006); United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90
(2006); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177
1734 [2008]
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After Hudson was decided, however, the Court seemed to lose its
appetite for a steady diet of Fourth Amendment cases for nearly two years.
In the October 2006 Term, the Court heard argument in exactly one Fourth
Amendment case 38 and peremptorily reversed in two more.3 9 Only one of
those three cases, Brendlin v. California, was a criminal matter; the question
considered in that case, whether passengers in a vehicle stopped by the
police are seized and thereby have "standing" to complain about the legality
of the stop, could have just as easily arisen in a civil suit as in a criminal
case. 40 More to the point, the question presented in Brendlin was a narrow
one that offered the parties (and the Justices) no opportunity to argue the
merits of the exclusionary rule.
For October 2007 Term, the argument calendar is now full, and the
Court has granted certiorari in only one Fourth Amendment case, Virginia v.
Moore.41 Like Brendlin, Moore is a criminal case that presents a question that
goes directly to the scope of the constitutional right itself, namely whether
the Fourth Amendment is violated when a police officer arrests a defendant
for a minor offense when state law generally prohibits officers from
performing custodial arrests for that offense. 42
While I suppose it is theoretically possible that Moore might have been
decided on exclusionary-rule grounds, the briefing and the arguments in
that case steered well clear of raising any questions about the legitimacy of
Mapp. When Moore was argued on January 14, 2008, Hudson was never
mentioned, and no Justice even hinted that the Court was considering using
Moore as a vehicle to re-examine Mapp.
In sum, the Court had largely stayed away from Fourth Amendment
cases the past two terms and, in particular, had stayed far away from any
(2004); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004); United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149
(2004); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003); United
States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003); Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003); Kirk v. Louisiana, 536
U.S. 635 (2002); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); United States v. Aruizu, 534 U.S. 266
(2002); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001);
florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774 (2001); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001); and Illinois v.
McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001). The nine civil cases were: Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005);
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004); Groh v. Ramirez,
540 U.S. 551 (2004); Board of Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Saucierv. Katz, 533 U.S. 194
(2001); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67
(2001); and City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
38. Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007).
39. L.A. County v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct. 1989 (2007); Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
40. The Court unanimously concluded in Brendlin that passengers in a vehicle stopped by
the police are seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 2407.
41. Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 28 (2007) (order granting certiorari).
42. The precise question presented in Moore is as follows: "Does the Fourth Amendment
require the suppression of evidence obtained incident to an arrest that is based upon probable
cause, where the arrest violates a provision of state law?" Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Moore,
128 S. Ct. 28 (No. 06-1082), at i.
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Fourth Amendment cases that might put Map into play. Indeed, the Court
had not even taken any cases that might have provided an opportunity to
extend Hudson's anti-exclusionary rhetoric to contexts beyond the knock-
and-announce rule.
The reason the Court was reticent to take on such cases after Hudson, I
suggest, is the lingering uncertainty as to what would actually happen if the
Court had a chance to overrule Mapp or extend Hudson. It takes fourJustices
to grant certiorari, of course, and there were four Justices in Hudson who
seemed prepared to overrule Mapp then and there.
But if those four Justices were to grant certiorari in a case in which the
question presented is something like, "Should Mapp v. Ohio be overruled?"
or "Should the rationale of Hudson be extended to cases where the police
could have obtained a warrant but failed to do so?" they could not be certain
which Justice Kennedy would show up on the conference day after
arguments. Perhaps it would be the same Justice Kennedy who supported
the parts of Justice Scalia's opinion in Hudson that denigrated the
exclusionary rule. If that Justice Kennedy showed up, there would be a
majority to overrule Mapp or, at the very least, to extend Hudson so far as to
make Mapp largely meaningless.
But perhaps the Justice Kennedy who would show up after argument
would be the same Justice Kennedy who issued a separate concurrence in
Hudson stating that the exclusionary rule is not in doubt. If that Justice
Kennedy showed up, granting certiorari in such a case could result in a
ringing reaffirmation of Mapp or, at least, a strong refusal to extend Hudson
beyond the knock-and-announce context.
By the same token, the four dissenters in Hudson would likely loathe to
grant certiorari in any such case, because they also do not know which
Justice Kennedy would show up to the post-argument conference. Thus,
while there are clearly fourJustices who are poised to overrule Mapp entirely
or severely undercut it by extending Hudson, and four more Justices who are
equally ready to reaffirm Mapp and/or limit Hudson to its narrow context,
there were not four Justices who were willing to risk granting certiorari in
any such cases until and unless Justice Kennedy tipped his hand or there was
a change in personnel on the Court.
I must concede that the Court's recent decision to grant certiorari in
Herring v. United States43 calls the above analysis into question, but not by very
much. Herring, which will be heard in October 2008 Term, is a criminal case
and it clearly concerns the proper scope of the exclusionary rule. The issue
in Herring is whether evidence found during a search incident to an arrest
should be excluded when the arresting officer relied on information
negligently provided by other law enforcement officers to conclude that
43. Herring v. United States, 492 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W.
3425 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2008) (No. 07-513).
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there were grounds to arrest the defendant.44 In Arizona v. Evans, the Court
held that when an officer relied on a quashed warrant that erroneously
remained in a computer database to arrest a defendant, the evidence found
incident to arrest would not be excluded because the exclusionary rule is
designed to deter "police misconduct, not mistakes by court employees."
45
Herring, then, could be resolved in one of two ways. Either the Court
could treat the case as simply a variation on Evans and decide whether the
exclusionary rule should apply when the mistake leading to arrest is made
not by a court employee but by a fellow officer, or the Court could
use Herring to cut back dramatically on, or eliminate completely, the
exclusionary rule itself.
It seems quite clear to me that the Court granted certiorari in Herring to
do the former, not the latter. The strongest indication that the Court does
not view Herring as a vehicle to overrule Mapp and Weeks is the Government's
brief in response to the certiorari petition. While that brief repeatedly cites
Hudson for the proposition that the exclusionary rule is to be applied
grudgingly, it never suggests that the exclusionary rule itself should be in
play.46 In other words, exactly as in Moore, the Government's argument at
the certiorari stage would have made the Justices reasonably confident that
they could vote to grant certiorari without having to confront Mapp and
Weeks directly. 47
B. FORCING THE COURT'S HAND: MOREAGGRESSIVE APPROACHES
TO HUDSON IN THE LOWER COURTS
Ultimately, the Court will have to determine the scope of Hudson. Is it a
decision peculiarly limited to the knock-and-announce rule, as Justice
Kennedy's concurrence suggested, or does the aggressively anti-Mapp
language of Justice Scalia's majority opinion portend a broad assault on the
exclusionary rule? Even if the Court seems reluctant now to answer that
question, very recent developments in the lower courts make it increasingly
likely that Mapp's fate will be sealed within a few years.
I will examine three decisions from the federal courts of appeals that
have come down in the last few months and use them to show that anti-
44. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *9, United States v. Herring, No. 07-513, 2007 WL
3045540 (filed Oct. 11, 2007).
45. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 7,14-15 (1995).
46. Brief for the United States in Opposition at "8, *10, *11, *14, *21, United States v.
Herring, No. 07-513, 2008 WL 194291 (filed Jan. 18, 2008).
47. Just six days after granting certiorari in Herring, the Court granted certiorari in
another Fourth Amendment case, Arizona v. Cant, 162 P.3d 640 (Ariz. 2007), cert. granted, 76
U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2008) (No. 07-542). The issue in Gant is whether the police may
search a car incident to arrest when the defendant was arrested outside the car and was fully
secured at the time of a search. Id Since Gant involves the propriety of police conduct instead
of the remedy to be applied to that conduct, it would be even less likely than Herring to be a
vehicle for the Court to revisit Mapp.
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exclusionary judges in the lower courts are not waiting for the Court to
explain Hudson. Instead, these judges are taking the initiative to expand the
Hudson rationale beyond the knock-and-announce context.
First, in United States v. Nichols,48 a Sixth Circuit panel relied in part on
Hudson to hold that a criminal defendant who claims that the police
engaged in racial profiling in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
cannot invoke the exclusionary rule because civil lawsuits sufficiently deter
police violations. 49 The panel observed that the Hudson majority spoke of
"the exclusionary rule in broad terms" while criticizing the rule's "'costly toll
upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives.' 50 According to the
panel, "Hudson reinforces our view that suppression is an extreme remedy,
and that-prior to adopting such a remedy-a court must be convinced of
the inadequacy of civil suits to safeguard against constitutional violations."51
Nichols thus apparently represents the first application by a federal circuit of
the anti-exclusionary rationale of Hudson to a context outside the Fourth
Amendment.52
Second, a divided Ninth Circuit panel used Hudson's rationale in United
States v. Ankeny to hold that suppression is not an available remedy for any
complaint that the police executed a warrant in an unreasonable manner. 53
In Ankeny, the defendant complained that the police executed the warrant
unreasonably by using a flash-bang device and firing rubber bullets. 54 But,
the majority rejected this contention:
The police had a warrant, the validity of which is not questioned,
and the guns, money, and other contraband were not hidden. Even
without the use of a flash-bang device, rubber bullets, or any of the
other methods that Defendant challenges, "the police would have
48. United States v. Nichols, No. 06-5862, 2008 WL 123815 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 2008).
49. In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Court held that a defendant who
claimed that the police selected him for seizure because of his race was making an equal
protection argument and not a Fourth Amendment argument so long as the police had
probable cause to justify the seizure. Id. at 813. The Court in Whren did not indicate whether a
defendant making such an equal protection claim could invoke the exclusionary rule.
50. Nichols, 2008 WL 123815, at *4 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2163
(2006)).
51. Id.
52. The Michigan Supreme Court-the same court that gave us People v. Stevens in the first
place-has recently relied on Hudson to hold that a defendant who has been questioned in
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot suppress the testimony of a witness
found as a result of the illegal questioning. People v. Frazier, 733 N.W.2d 713, 722-25 (Mich.
2007).
53. United States v. Ankeny, 502 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2007).
54. Id. at 836.
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executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have
discovered the [evidence] inside the house."55
Thus, under Ankeny's rationale, any challenge to the unreasonable
manner in which authorities carry out a Fourth Amendment search or seizure
cannot result in exclusion so long as the same evidence would have been
found had the search or seizure been reasonable. This holding greatly
expands the reach of Hudson beyond the knock-and-announce context.56
The third and perhaps most aggressive use of Hudson by a federal
appellate court is the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in United States v.
Cazares-Olivas.57 In Cazares-Olivas, federal agents attempted to obtain a
telephonic warrant for a nighttime raid, but neither the judge who approved
the raid over the phone nor the agents who requested the warrant actually
prepared any piece of paper amounting to a warrant. Relying on Hudson, the
panel held that the absence of any warrant was not fatal because the same
search would have been carried out had the judge actually prepared a
warrant after the telephone conversation. 58
I do not, of course, expect any lower court to take it upon itself to
announce that Mapp has been overruled and will no longer be applied in
that circuit or that state.59 But, as Nichols, Ankeny, and Cazares-Olivas
demonstrate, the broad anti-exclusionary language in the majority opinion
in Hudson naturally will lead some federal appellate and state supreme court
judges to expand Hudson to new and different contexts.
In short, while the Court may not have any desire at the moment to
revisit Mapp and Hudson, there will soon be plenty of cases that may force
the Court to act. But, I think the Court will wait at least another year to do
SO.
CONCLUSION: RESOLUTION IN 2009?
Ultimately, I believe the presidential election of November 2008 will
determine the fate of Mapp and, therefore, whether Hudson is ultimately
seen as a big case or a mere footnote. The current uncertainty as to the fate
55. Id. at 837-38 (quoting Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2164) (alteration in original). The
dissenting judge argued, relying on Justice Kennedy's concurrence that Hudson should not be
extended beyond the knock-and-announce context. Id. at 842-43 (Reinhardt,J., dissenting).
56. In sharp contrast to Ankeny, the Minnesota Supreme Court recently rejected a
prosecutor's argument that Hudson should be extended so as to render exclusion inapplicable
for home searches unconstitutionally performed at night. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 178
(Minn. 2007).
57. United States v. Cazares-Olivas, 515 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2008).
58. Id. at 729.
59. I sincerely doubt that any federal circuit judges will be so bold as to declare Mapp
overruled before the Court does so itself, though I would have said the same thing about
Miranda before the Fourth Circuit's decision in Dickerson. See United States v. Dickerson, 166
F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that Congress in 1968 had effectively overruled Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), rev'd, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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of the exclusionary rule hinges on the composition of the court as it stands
now.
The next President is almost certain to replace several of the current
Justices. If any of the Hudson dissenters are replaced by a law-and-order
Republican President, it is hard to see how Mapp would survive. If any of
those in the Hudson majority are replaced by a civil-libertarian Democratic
President, it seems likely that a strong reaffirmation of Mapp would follow.
My prediction, then, is that the fate of Mapp will be decided this
November when the returns come in. And, as somebody who worries more
than he should about what his obituary will say, I'll be staying up late.
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